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I. PARTIES BELOW AND ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs and appellants 438 Main Partnership, Rainbow Trout, Inc. and Triple 
Eagle, Inc. ("plaintiffs") brought a products liability action against the manufacturers of a 
heat cable, Easy Heat, Inc. and Heron Cable Industries (collectively "Easy Heat"). 
Plaintiffs brought negligence claims against Moon Roofing ("Moon"), the installer of the 
cable, and Alpine Electric ("Alpine"), the installer of electrical components for the cable. 
They also made negligence claims against Quality Interiors ("Quality"), the tenant of the 
436 Main building, and Melva Garcia ("Garcia"), the 436 Main building owner, for 
causing the cable to be "on" and energized, during the middle of summer. Garcia sued 
Easy Heat, Quality, Moon and Alpine on identical theories. Plaintiffs and Garcia settled 
with Moon, Alpine and Quality. Garcia settled also with Easy Heat. Hence, Moon, 
Alpine and Quality are not involved in this appeal. 
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IV. JURISDICTION 
The Court's jurisdiction is pursuant to Art, VIII, §§ 3 and 5 of the Utah 
Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0), and Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
V. ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Were the findings in support of the order granting defendants' motion for 
nonsuit or involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) sufficiently "complete, accurate and 
consistent" to "disclose the steps" the trial court followed to reach the "ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue"? This issue is reviewed for correctness. Woodward v. 
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (deference given the trial court only 
"when the findings of fact are sufficiently detailed"). When findings are legally 
insufficient, plaintiffs "need not engage in a futile marshaling exercise." Williamson v. 
Williamson, 823 P.2d 474,477 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). This issue was preserved at Record 
("R.") 6468-71,6735-92,7032-70, June 30,2000 H.T. added to record by stipulation. 
B. Did the trial court err in granting defendants' motion for nonsuit or 
dismissal under Rule 41(b) at the close of plaintiffs' case on the ground that plaintiffs had 
failed to establish a prima facie case? This issue is reviewed for correctness. Bair v. 
Axion Design, L.L.C., 200 UT 20,20 P.3d 388. This issue was preserved at R. 6468-71, 
6735-92,7032-70. 
C. Were the findings against the clear weight of the evidence? When 
challenging findings, "appellant must prove they are clearly erroneous, i.e., against the 
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clear weight of the evidence." Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477. This issue was preserved at 
R. 6468-71,6735-92,7032. 
D. In considering the motion for nonsuit on plaintiffs' strict liability claim, did 
the trial court improperly rely on negligence principles? This issue is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,938 (Utah 1994). This issue was preserved at 
R. 7394. 
E. Was the trial court's summary judgment granting dismissal of the warnings 
claim reversible error? This issue is reviewed for correctness. Id. This issue was 
preserved at R. 3754. 
F. Did the trial court err in holding that plaintiffs failed to establish that Melva 
Garcia owed a duty of care to ensure the cable's toggle switch was off? This issue was 
preserved at R. 1923. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 15,1993 a fire destroyed two historic buildings at 436 and 438 Main 
Street in Park City. Fire officials and independent investigators determined that the fire 
was caused by a heat cable attached to the fascia board on the rear of the 436 Main 
building, which spread to 438 Main. 
A bench trial commenced on May 22,2000, before Judge Thome who, by then, 
had been appointed to the Utah Court of Appeals. Plaintiffs advanced claims of strict 
liability, negligence and breach of warranty against Easy Heat, and a negligence claim 
against Garcia. By stipulation, much of the evidence was submitted in written proffers. 
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Plaintiffs called Park City Fire District Fire Marshal Sam Coleman ("Coleman''), Park 
City Fire Marshall Ron Ivey ("Ivey"), Garcia's origin and cause experts Jake Jacobsen 
("Jacobsen"), Michael Foley ("Foley"), plaintiffs' origin and cause expert John Blundell 
("Blundell"), and damages witnesses.1 Plaintiffs submitted the testimony of Ron Kilgore, 
Ph.D., an electrical engineer who established the precise defect in the cable that caused 
the fire, and Ed Schaefer who established a reasonably feasible alternative design that 
would have prevented the fire. Plaintiffs submitted the testimony of Vytenis Babrauskas, 
PhD., a renowned fire scientist who established that the short circuit in the cable created 
enough heat and flame to ignite the insulating PVC and the attached fascia board. 
Defendants moved for a nonsuit or involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) at the 
end of plaintiffs' case.2 Judge Thorne granted the motion based on his conclusion that 
plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case. His reasons included: (a) defendants 
asserted they had no prior fire claims from this type of cable; (b) defendants asserted the 
cable met the requirements of the Canadian Standards Association ("CSA"), a private 
listing agency; (c) defendants asserted the cable met the requirements of the National 
Electric Code ("NEC"); and (d) according to defendants, the cable was "state of the art." 
(R. 6672.) On May 31,2000 and on June 1,2000, at a further hearing on the same Rule 
xBefore Garcia settled with Easy Heat, she shared the cost of these experts. 
2The parties accommodated schedules of the others' witnesses. Hence, before 
plaintiffs rested, Easy Heat presented a cause and origin expert, an electrical engineer and 
a chemical engineer. 
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41(b) motion, plaintiffs explained that the court had erred by failing to consider plaintiffs' 
evidence to determine whether they had presented a prima facie case. Plaintiffs also 
informed the court that it had improperly applied negligence principles to a strict product 
liability claim. The court then decided that the fire had not started in the cable, and 
granted the motion for nonsuit, dismissing the case under Rule 41(b). The court 
thereafter entered cursory findings and conclusions to which plaintiffs objected. Plaintiffs 
filed a timely motion for new trial which the trial court denied. (R. 7657-60.) Plaintiffs 
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. 7661-63.) 
VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court held that plaintiffs had not proved a prima facie case. This 
statement sets forth the prima facie evidence. In Section VIII.C., plaintiffs also marshal 
the evidence that supports the findings and demonstrate that the findings are against the 
clear weight of the evidence. 
A. SUMMARY. 
Five origin and cause experts independently investigated this fire at the scene and 
concluded it had originated in the southeast comer of the 436 building. The only heat 
source not ruled out as the cause of the fire by each investigator was the Easy Heat roof 
deicing cable ("heat cable") attached to a fascia board next to the southeast comer of the 
roof. It was undisputed that at the time of the fire and for some period of time leading up 
to the ignition, the cable was energized—the toggle switch that controlled it was "on." 
Plaintiffs' scientific experts testified concerning the product's defects, the ignition 
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mechanism and the spread of the fire. There was no other possible cause of the fire at the 
origin. Defendants conceded that in the area of origin advanced by plaintiffs, the only 
possible ignition source was the heat cable. 
B. ORIGIN AND CAUSE EVIDENCE. 
1. Setting. 
The fire erupted in the 436 Main building and spread into the 438 Main building. 
(Exh. 3(a) photos 2 showing front of building, and 3 showing rear of building; Add. p. A-
20.) The configuration of the buildings, their construction and the slope of the 436 Main 
roof is critical to understanding how this fire spread. The 436 Main building had a 
showroom with a white roof, and a newer addition called "the storage shed," covered by 
asphalt shingles over a galvanized metal roof. (Exh. 1, photo 10; Add. p. A-3.) The 
buildings faced west and stood on the east side of Main Street in Park City. Exhibit 27 
shows the Quality building (436 Main) in the middle with the Szechwan/Pop Jenks 
building (438 Main) to the north of 436 Main, and the Irish Camel to the south. (Exh. 27; 
Add. p. A-29, is attached to the addendum so that the top of the exhibit is north.) 
The 436 Main roof sloped from a high point on the west at the front of the building 
on Main Street, down to a low point on the east at the rear of the building, which is 
adjacent to Swede Alley. (Exh. 1, photo 9; Add. p. A-3; and Exh. 3(a), photo 11 depicts 
the slope of the roof of the storage shed, attached as Add. p. A-21.) The storage shed roof 
was constructed of two-by-ten roof joists, also sloping downhill from west to east. (Exh. 
1, photos 31 & 32; Add. p. A-8.) The original east exterior wall of the showroom 
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adjoined the west exterior wall of the added storage shed, so there was space between the 
walls referred to as a "dead space," about six to eight inches wide. (Tr.t. 318; R. 7105. 
See also photos 15 & 16 of Exh. 1; Add. p. A-4.) The storage room had two smaller 
rooms: the north room (white walls and ceiling) (Exh. 1; photo 33, Add. p. A-9); and the 
south room (brown paneling on walls and ceiling) (Exh. 1, photo 45-46; Add. p. A-18). 
2. The Fire; First Responders. 
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on June 15,1993, Bill Ferris ("Ferris"), a bartender for 
Pop Jenks in the 438 Main basement, went outside to empty the trash. He "saw fire on 
the exterior of the building in the southeast comer at the roof level." (Tr.t. 314; R. 7104.) 
He called 911, and then threw buckets of water on the fire at the southeast comer of the 
roof line. (Tr.t 314-15; R. 7104.) Park City police officer Ryan first saw fire in the 
southeast comer at the roof line along the fascia board. (Tr.t. 156-57; R. 7072.) This was 
exactly where the energized heat cable attached to the fascia. (Tr.t. 160-61, R. 7073.) 
Lt. Bums ("Bums") commanded the first fire truck that arrived. It pulled up in 
front of 436 Main, but Bums saw no flame and no smoke. They drove around the back to 
the Swede Alley side, where Bums saw smoke emanating from the roof line along the 
southeast comer of 436 Main. (Tr.t. 100-03; R. 7065-66; Exh. 27, adjacent to the line 
demarcated "power line".) He and his crew went inside 436 Main, but found no fire in 
the showroom, and no fire in the storage rooms, except in the southeast comer ceiling of 
the brown panel room. (Tr.t. 106; R. 7066.) After the initial attack of the fire on the 
ceiling in the southeast comer of the storage room, Bums went out the back (east) of the 
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building; he watched the electrical line that supplied power to 436 Main violently arc and 
snap in two. (Tr.t. 133; R. 7069.) When firefighter Anderson first arrived with Burns, he 
saw flames at the rear of 436 Main coming from just below the roof line at the south end. 
(Anderson proffered testimony, p. 1; R. 6143.) 
Bums reviewed Exhibit 28, a videotape of the fire, and said that the fire had "gone 
from the Quality Interiors into the plumes of the construction in the common wall 
[between 436 and 438 Main]. [Then it went] up through that structure of the wall space 
into the ceiling space of the 438 Main, and then traveled across 438 Main just in the 
ceiling roof area." (Tr.t. 124-25; R. 7068.) The firefighters could not put out the fire 
because it had raged through the roof of the storage room uphill into the roof structure 
above the concealed dead space between the showroom and the storage room, and 
eventually into the attic above the showroom. (Tr.t. 119; R. 7068.) "In the storage area, 
[the fire] was easier to get to, and they were able to get in and put the fire out fairly 
quickly. It was the main part of the building that we were having the problem, and that's 
where the fire had gone to at that time." (Tr.t. 140-41; R. 7070.) Bums first saw fire 
breaking "through the roof about one and a half hours into the fire. (Tr.t. 135; R. 7070 .) 
Chief Kelly Gee ("Gee") of the Park City Fire District arrived soon after the fire 
was called in, and saw fire emanating from the southeast comer of the 436 Main building, 
just above the "No Parking" sign. This is the only place where he saw a flame on the 
outside of the building. (R. 6144-47.) He went inside to the southeast comer where a 
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sprinkler was going off, and the first hose company was spraying water on the ceiling in 
the southeast comer in the storage room. (R. 6144.) 
When Coleman first arrived at the scene at 2:00 a.m., he too saw no flames or 
smoke on the Main Street side, but saw flames and smoke emanating from the southeast 
comer of the 436 Main building. (Tr.t. 147; R. 7071.) Coleman stayed at the fire scene 
during the entire four to five hours while the fire was fought. When the first firefighters 
came out of the building, early in the fire they told Coleman the fire had gone from the 
point or origin, where they had first attacked it in the southeast comer, and was working 
its way west, up hill, toward Main Street in the attic. (Tr.t. 149; R. 7071.) 
The firefighters had a very hard time controlling the fire because it was burning in 
concealed spaces that were difficult, if not impossible, to reach. (R. 6145.) Shortly after 
Coleman arrived, at least two firefighters were on the 436 Main roof trying to trench 
ventilation holes in the roof to let the fire out. (Tr.t. 185; R. 6144.) At about 4:00 a.m., 
the fire had grown to such intensity that Gee believed that it would progress into the 
Texas Reds building north of the 438 Main building. He deployed personnel into a 
defensive mode to protect the Texas Reds building and called for help from the Salt Lake 
County Fire Department At about dawn, the fire was finally out. (R. 6146.) 
3. Origin and Cause Investigation. 
a. Coleman: Coleman had been the District Fire Marshal since 1983. He had 
extensive training in fire cause and origin investigation and had determined the cause and 
origin of about 60 to 70 fires as of the date of this fire. (Tr.t. 144-46; R. 7071.) He set 
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out to answer two questions: "Where did the fire start, and why did it start.'' (Tr.t. 155; 
R. 7072.) 
Coleman knew dispatch had reported that the fire was seen at the rear of 436 Main. 
(Tr.t. 154; R. 7072.) He also knew that Ryan, the first to arrive, had seen smoke and 
flames there, and that the first firefighters saw no smoke in the front, but saw smoke in 
the southeast comer of the roof of 436 Main. Coleman testified: 
That's a pretty good indication right there [in] the initial steps of the cause 
and origin investigation... that's where the fire started. . . . I didn't start 
looking there immediately. I started—you have to look at the entire scene 
and then work your way in and down to the area of origin. 
(Tr.t. 156-57; R. 7072.) Coleman knew that all points of potential origin should be 
considered equally likely until eliminated by an investigation. (Tr.t. 176; R. 7075.) He 
also knew that once an area of origin was identified, all potential sources of ignition 
should likewise be considered equally likely until eliminated. (Id.) During his 
investigation, he followed nationally recognized standards and protocols. (Tr.t. 175.) 
From his experience during the fire, and from his investigation throughout the 
morning, Coleman saw no evidence of fire origin in the showroom or on the north back 
(white) room of the 436 Main building. (Tr.t. 155-56; R. 7072.) The only area of 436 
Main that he thought was a probable area of origin was the southeast comer of the 436 
Main building. (Tr.t 156.) In that area, he saw several potential sources of ignition, 
including the UP&L power supply and junction boxes leading from a mast in the 
southeast corner to various electrical breaker components on the interior of the storage 
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room, (Tr.t. 161; R. 7073.) In the southeast room he found conduit going from an 
exterior electrical outlet to a switch on the south wall. (Tr.t. 162; R. 7073.) 
He climbed on the storage room roof to look for other ignition sources and noted 
the heat cable. (Tr.t. 192-93; R. 7077.) He also saw a rusty exhaust fan hood, and some 
orange wiring. He eliminated the ventilation hood, and orange wiring on the roof, 
because they showed no signs of fire ignition. (Tr.t. 161-63; R. 7073; Tr.t. 198; R. 7077.) 
The heat cable was attached to the eastern edge of the 436 Main storage shed roof. (Tr.t. 
160; Exh. 1, photos 15-16; Add. p. A-4.) The heat cable was plugged into a melted 
exterior duplex in the southeast corner, approximately a foot below the roof line. (Exh. 1, 
photo 21; Add. p. A-6; Tr.t. 160; R. 7073.) He had investigated other heat cable fires, so 
he thought the cable might be a potential ignition source. (Id.) The toggle switch 
controlling the duplex into which the heat cable was plugged was in the "on" position. 
(Id. at 162.) He confirmed that there was power to the switch by following the electrical 
line from the switch to the breaker box. (Id. at 163.) The cable had been burned into two 
pieces. One was hanging from the melted exterior duplex plug, and the other was 
attached to the roof with a burned-off end hanging over the roof above the duplex in the 
southeast comer. (Tr.t. 205-06; Exh. 1, #21,31-32.) He had eliminated all other probable 
sources of ignition, and had found an energized heat-producing product burned into two 
sections in the middle of a probable area of origin. He concluded that the heat cable was 
the most probable source of ignition. (Tr.t. 180; R. 7075.) 
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Coleman concluded that the fire had been ignited by the cable, burned through the 
fascia board and then traveled between the joists up to the high point of the shed roof (up 
hill) west toward Main Street. (Tr.t. 230-32; R. 7081-82.) It then burned within the walls 
of the dead space between the eastern old exterior wall of the showroom and the western 
wall of the newer shed. (Id. See Exh. 1, Photo 45-46 (Add. p. A-18) for view of dead 
space.) At about this time, it also raced to the north and breached the common wail 
between 436 Main and 438 Main on the south side of 438 Main. (Tr.t. 230-32; R. 7081-
82, for view of dead space from a perspective in the south storage room; see Exh. 1, photo 
47 (Add. p. A-10), for area where fire breached 438 Main at the intersection of the dead 
space; see Exh. 1, photos 7 and 8, left side, Add. p. A-2.) Eventually, it burned through 
the exterior east wall of the showroom and into the attic. (Id.) 
Coleman examined the fire as part of his governmental duties, and believed that he 
was competent to determine the cause and origin, that he completely and adequately 
determined the cause of origin, and that his conclusions were reliable. (Tr.t. 234-38; R. 
7078.) At trial, Coleman stated: "To me it was a pretty simple fire." (Tr.t. 201; R. 7078.) 
b. Ivey: The second fire official to examine the scene for origin and cause was 
Park City Fire Marshal Ivey. He first stood on Marsac Hill high above and to the east of 
Main Street and examined the buildings, noticing much more fire damage in the 436 
Main structure especially in the rear of 436 Main. (Ivey proffer at p. 1; R. 6160.) He 
examined the southeast corner of 436 Main, noting potential sources of ignition such as 
the service mast, the meter base and meters attached to the service mast. He eliminated 
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these as ignition sources. (R. 6160-62.) He traced the circuit that served the heat cable 
and found the switch was in the "on" position. At the area of the origin, he found the 
burned remnants of the heat cable still plugged into the melted duplex receptacle. (Id.) 
He traced the circuit to the breaker panel, and saw that the breaker for that circuit had 
tripped. (Id.) He carefully examined the heat cable and found that one of the conductors 
was broken at a staple. (Id.) The staple appeared to be the kind electricians use to secure 
wire. (Id.) Just beneath the burned segment of the cable hanging over the roof edge, the 
entire fascia board had burned away leaving a gaping hole of chases 1 through 3. (Id. at 
p. 3; R. 6162.) There was simply no other logical source of ignition in the area of the 
origin other than the heat cable. (Id. at p. 3; R. 6162.) 
c. Jacobsen: The morning after the fire, Garcia's insurer hired Robert Jacobsen, of 
Bum Pattern Analysis, to investigate the origin and cause of the fire. (Tr.t. 308; R. 7103.) 
Jacobsen had investigated 350-400 fires since retiring from firefighting, and had testified 
in court many times. (Tr.t. 306-07; R. 7103.) Jacobsen responded that morning and spent 
16 hours over the next two days investigating the fire. (Tr.t. 322; R. 7105.) 
Jacobsen employed all of the standard steps in determining an area of origin. He 
examined the exterior of the structure and the areas of the heaviest fire damage. Coleman 
gave Jacobsen very detailed information about how the fire was fought. (Tr.t. 666; R. 
7159.) Jacobsen also interviewed Gee, Lt. Hunan and Ivey. (Id.) He conducted an 
objective investigation without preconceptions about the cause or origin. He did not 
focus too early on a particular origin or cause. (Tr.t. 602; R. 7151.) After hours on the 
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scene, he concluded that the fire started in the southeast corner on the exterior of the 
building, just below the roof level. (Tr.t 325; R. 7106.) He took 68 photographs (Exh. 1) 
of the scene to document his work. In addition, he took into custody remnants, 
receptacles, cables, clips, the conduit switch and plug associated with the heat cable, as 
well as the breaker, which was later tested and found to have been in working order. 
(Tr.t. 388-403; R. 7113-15; Exh. 1; photos 45-62; Add. pp. A-10 to A-18.) 
At trial he described in painstaking detail the facts that led him to conclude that the 
fire had started in the fascia board covering the two southernmost chases of the storage 
room roof. The southernmost chase, chase 1, located at the far (south) left edge of 
photograph 31 and 32 of Exh. 1, suffered the most fire damage. (Tr.t. 352; R. 7109.) The 
corrugated steel roofing material that covered the top of the first chase was severely 
oxidized, leaving a rust-colored imprint, signifying a longer bum in that area. (Tr.t. 411-
412; R. 7116; Exh. 1, photos 31-32.) Jacobsen examined the interior of chase 1 to see if 
there was another ignition source in that chase and saw there was none. (Tr.t. 669-70; R. 
7159.) Jacobsen explained that the fire traveled in the chases from the fascia board up to 
the highest point of the storage room roof. (Tr.t. 346; R. 7108.) It turned through the 
west wall of the storage room and into the dead space, or "gap between the two walls, 
[then] the fire was allowed additional combustible air, combustion air, and additional fuel 
to bum at that location." (Tr.t. 347; R. 7108.) "The fire propagated in that area for a long 
while and in addition traveled freely in the air space north to the 438 Main building." 
(Tr.t. 348; R. 7108.) Jacobsen also viewed a video of the fire made by Park City police 
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department; he showed how earlier in the fire the fascia board covering chase 1 had 
completely burned away. (Tr.t. 416-17; Exh. 28, (video)). 
First he explained how other areas of the storage room roof structure suffered 
greater fire damage than the origin area in the southeast comer. (Tr.t. 440; R. 7120; See 
Exh. 1, photos 45-46, Add. p. A-18.) The fire was essentially put out in the origin area by 
the first attack by the firefighters, and once the fire reached the height of the storage room 
roof where it intersected with the east exterior showroom wall, it burned in the concealed 
area, which was not covered by the sprinkler system. (Tr.t. 344-45; R. 7108.) Given that 
the fire could not be reached with hose streams, it burned for a longer period of time, 
causing more damage than the lower area of origin, which was easily accessible and was 
reached by firefighters both from the inside and outside. (Tr.t. 440-41; R. 7120.) 
The sprinkler system in the 436 Main building operated. Some heads came on but 
did not put out the fire because the fire raged in areas that were not sprinkled such as the 
chases, dead space, and in the ceiling above the sprinklers. Although the attic above the 
showroom was fully covered by the sprinkler system, by the time the fire entered the 
attic, it was too great for the sprinkler system to handle. (Tr.t. 652; R. 7157.) 
Jacobsen described how he concluded that the cable ignited the fire. First he 
identified all the potential sources of ignition in the southeast comer and the roof area. 
He eliminated the service mast. (Tr.t. 404-405; R. 7116.) He determined that the meter 
base that received electrical lines from the utility were not the cause of the fire. (Tr.t. 
363-66; R. 7110-11; Exh. 1, photos 21,22,23 & 24; Add. pp. A-6 to A-7.) The orange 
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communication line that ran through the roof along the east edge of the 436 Main storage 
room roof did not ignite the fire because it was communication wire not carrying much 
electricity, and it showed no signs of arcing failure or heat. (Tr.t. 369; R. 7111; Exh. 1, 
photos 17-18.) The duplex outlet into which the cable was plugged did not ignite the fire, 
because it showed no internal damage. (Tr.t. 371; R. 7111.) The swamp cooler atop the 
roof above the showroom did not cause the fire; in any event, the switch to the swamp 
cooler was in the "off' position. (Tr.t. 367-68; R. 7111.) He also examined potential 
sources of ignition in other areas that experienced heavy burning. (Tr.t. 332-33,336-37; 
R. 7106-7107.) He eliminated as potential causes the rusty exhaust fan on the storage 
room roof. (Id.; Exh. 1, photos 15 and 16.) First, it was some distance from the area of 
origin; second, the electrical wiring in the unit showed no signs of overheating. (Id.) 
Critically, the breaker to the heat cable circuit was tripped but no other breakers were 
tripped. (Tr.t. 357-68; R. 7110-11; Exh. 3A. #35, attached as Add. p. A-22.) Jacobsen 
eliminated all of the other potential causes, not only in the southeast corner, but in the 
entire 436 Main building. 
Jacobsen testified that the portion of the cable that produced heat had been 
attached to the fascia board, and that the part of the cable hanging from the melted plug 
had been painted the same red-orange paint as the exterior of the east end of 436 Main. 
(Tr.t. 373-75; R. 7112; Exh. 3(d), photos 2,14.) A clip with a nail hole was found still 
clamped into the painted cable, and the clip was identical to those used to attach the cable 
to the roof. (Id.) Thus, the clip had been nailed to the building. (Id.) 
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d. Foley: Jacobsen had Garcia's insurer hire Mike Foley to fly from Denver to Salt 
Lake City to investigate the electrical components associated with the fire. Foley is an 
electrical engineer with unique experience as a cause and origin investigator. He 
carefully examined the scene and documented his investigation with photographs and 
written notes. (Exh. 3(a), 3(b), 3(c) & 3(d).) He also concluded that the area of origin 
was in the southeast corner of the 436 building near the roof edge. (R. 6384.) He 
eliminated as ignition sources: the electrical service mast because the damage done to it 
was external, a result of the fire and not the cause of the fire (R. 6384); the orange 
communication wire emanating from the roof near the area of origin, because it was 
communication cable not related to the electrical systems of the building (R. 6384); and 
the electrical meters (R. 6384). 
He also documented that the 20 amp circuit breaker for the heat cable was tripped 
and no other breakers were tripped. (R. 6385; Exh. 3(a), photo 35.) He tested the breaker 
and confirmed that it was functioning within proper limits. (R. 6385.) With experts from 
Easy Heat, he performed sophisticated tests on the cable at the Colorado School of Mines. 
The heat cable fragment found hanging over the edge of the roof in the area of origin had 
evidence on the conductors that they had suffered an internal electrical arc. The 
conductors looked different than they would have looked had they been exposed to 
external heat from a fire. Rather, the evidence demonstrated that the arcing inside the 
cable had ignited the fire. (R.6385.) 
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Foley painstakingly reconstructed how the cable had most likely been attached to 
the fascia board of the building, based on bum patterns on the cable remnant and building 
and based on how the clip attached to the orange-red painted cable was likely attached to 
the building. (See Exh. 3(d), photos 2 &14; Exh. 3(b), photos 34-35.) He concluded that 
the cable was affixed to the roof nine inches below the roof line, near the border between 
chases 1 and 2. (R. 6387.) (See Exh. 91, attached to Add. p. A-31; R. 6387.) 
There were no other electrical circuits in the area of the origin. (R. 6387.) Other 
clips attaching the cable to the roof had been over-driven into the cable, deforming the 
cable. (R. 6387.) Foley concluded that had the heat cable not been attached to the fascia 
board, the fire would not have occurred. (R. 6388.) He also opined that had the cable 
included some safety devices, which Easy Heat warnings said were "optional," such as a 
ground fault circuit interrupter (GFCI), or a thermostat, more likely than not the fire 
would not have occurred. (R. 6388.) 
e. Blundell: The final origin and cause expert to examine the building was John 
Blundell, retained by the fire insurer for plaintiff 438 Main. Like Jacobsen, Blundell is a 
former firefighter, who had extensive origin and cause experience. Blundell had been the 
Fire Marshal for West Valley City for ten years, where he investigated 750 to 1000 fires. 
(Tr.t. 699-700; R. 7163.) Before the fire, he had run Global Investigations for over a 
year, and during that time had investigated over 150 fires. (Tr.t. 700; R. 7163.) 
He investigated the fire on June 17,1993, two days after it occurred. Like 
Coleman, Ivey, Jacobsen and Foley, Blundell conducted his investigation according to 
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industry standards, by first examining the exterior of both buildings, discovering the fire 
damage patterns and analyzing those patterns to come up with a probable area oforigin. 
(Tr.t. 792, 811; R. 7188.) Like Jacobsen, he thoroughly photographed the exterior and 
interior of the scene. (Tr.t. 708-709; R. 7164.) 
After several hours, Blundell concluded that the area oforigin was the southeast 
comer of 436 Main near the roof in the area of the fascia board. (Tr.t. 714; R. 7165.) He 
testified that the fire went up the chases to the highest point of the storage room roof, then 
into the dead space and through it north into the 438 Main building. (Tr.t. 712-14; R. 
7165.) It eventually burned into the attic above the showroom. 
Blundell also determined that the cable was a probable source of ignition. In the 
area oforigin he searched for a cause or a source of heat. (Tr.t. 725; R. 7166.) Blundell 
found very few sources of ignition in the area oforigin. At the time he examined the 
structure, the artifacts associated with the heat cable, including the conduit, switch, circuit 
breaker, and cable attached to the roof, had been photographed and diagramed and 
removed by Foley and Jacobsen. (Id.) Coleman had taken possession of the bumed cable 
remnant found hanging from the melted plug. He eliminated as ignition sources the 
electric service mast, (Tr.t. 727; R. 7166), and the exhaust fan because it was not in the 
area oforigin. (Tr.t. 728-29; R. 7167.) The only heat source in the area oforigin was the 
heat cable. (Tr.t. 792, 826; R. 7188,7192.) 
Blundell explained that had the fire started in the attic above the showroom, 
(where Easy Heat's expert testified it started), it would have been first seen breaking 
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through the showroom roof or through the west facade on Main Street, because the 
showroom roof sloped up toward the Main Street side of the building. (Tr.t. 732; R. 
7167.) Had the fire started in the dead space, it would have traveled quickly horizontally 
through that space into 438 Main, and would have been seen first either in the 438 Main 
building or emanating from 438 Main's exterior. (Tr.t. 731; R. 7167.) Had the fire 
started in the dead space, it would not have burned down the chases in the storage room 
because "fire doesn't burn down, fire burns up and out. And it is very uncommon to get a 
fire to burn down unless we've got a flammable liquid accelerant that carries it down, 
downhill." (Tr.t. 732; R. 7167.) There was "no evidence whatsoever that it started [in the 
attic] no doubt in my mind." (Tr.t. 732; R. 7167.) 
Blundell explained that the area of origin had the heaviest burn, because the fascia 
board was completely consumed. (Tr.t. 800; R. 7189.) Admittedly, another area of heavy 
burn was where the storage room roof joists meet the exterior wall of the showroom attic. 
(Tr.t 753; R. 7183.) He explained that there was long unchecked burning in that 
concealed space because it was inaccessible and out of the reach of sprinklers. (Tr.t. 801-
802; R. 7183.) 
Even defense experts agreed all sources of ignition in the plaintiffs' area of origin, 
except the cable, were eliminated. (Tr.t 1475; R. 7301.) This point is critical: if plaintiffs 
were right about the origin of the fire, all parties agree concerning the cause in that area. 
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4* Heat Cable. 
Plaintiffs' theory of how the heat cable caused the fire is best summarized by the 
proffered testimony of Dr. Kilgore ("Kilgore"). (R. 6397-6408A.) The heat cable is 
designed to melt ice. Accordingly, the design of the heat cable is centered around 
producing heat. Enough heat causes fire. The physical evidence establishes that the heat 
cable was energized and left on at the time of the fire, a summer day. (Tr.t. 162; R. 7073; 
Tr.t. 356-57; R. 7109; Tr.t. 1475; R. 7301.) The construction of this cable consists of two 
small copper-alloy heating conductors wrapped in PVC insulation. (R. 6402.) The two 
wires are then surrounded by an aluminum braid that looks similar to a coaxial cable 
braid. (Id.) The braid is then covered by an outer PVC jacket. (Id.) 
There are three types of electrical faults that could occur on this type of cable: (1) a 
hot to neutral (the two resistance conductors); (2) hot to ground (braid); or (3) neutral to 
ground (braid). (R. 6402.) At some point in time the PVC protecting the heat cable was 
damaged. 438 Main's experts believe this was caused by overdriving the clips used to 
attach the cable to the roof which had occurred elsewhere on portions of the cable that 
were not destroyed. (Tr.t. 794; R. 7188.) An electrical fault occurred at the 32 inch 
location of the cable due to this damage. (R. 6408.) This was a neutral-to-ground fault 
(Id.) At some point before the fire, the neutral element separated or "opened," allowing 
electricity to flow, not through the neutral element back to the cold junction, but into the 
aluminum braid. (R. 6408A.) When the copper-alloy conductor neutral wire touches the 
-20-
aluminum braid, a poor connection results, which generates heat (Id.) Over time higher 
temperatures are generated, causing a spiraling failure. (Id.) 
Kilgore thoroughly tested this theory in laboratory experiments. (R. 6404.) One 
test included taking an exemplar cable and slicing it open at the 32 inch location. (Id.) 
The braid and neutral were exposed and touched at this location. (Id.) A maximum of 
176 degrees Fahrenheit was measured. The same test was repeated with the neutral wire 
severed. (Id.) This forced all current going through the cable to go through the 
aluminum/copper connections. A temperature of 330 degrees Fahrenheit was measured. 
(Id.) Given time, this temperature could easily go up to fire-causing temperatures. (Id.) 
This would produce sufficient heat to ignite the PVC. (R. 6401.) 
Kilgore testified as to the manufacturer of the cable that "[p]art of the engineering 
function is to determine likely failure modes and foreseeable misuses and make sure 
warnings—if those failure modes in foreseeable misuses cannot be designed out of the 
product, make sure the instructions include warnings to that effect" (R. 6405.) 
Concerning product defects, Kilgore testified that Easy Heat failed to test and determine 
potential failure modes for this product, and that an aluminum braid, rather than a copper 
braid, "would easily burst into flames" under certain short circuit scenarios. He testified 
that obvious misuses include overdriving staples, hitting with a hammer, walking on the 
cable, leaving it energized in the summer, not using GFCIs or GFPDs, improper circuit 
protection, improper grounding, or anything that would cause mechanical damage, 
incorrect circuit voltage, overlapping cable, and excessive thermal insulation. The 
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instructions were totally inadequate because of the vague statement of use of a GFPD as a 
"recommended optional device." Other than a cryptic comment in the instruction, Easy 
Heat was ignorant of obvious failure modes. (R. 6404-5.) 
He testified that the use of the aluminum braid was a product defect, and that the 
industry learned in the 1970s that aluminum was a very poor choice for small conductor 
material. Aluminum has not been used in home wiring since the 1970s. There are 
dozens, if not hundreds, of articles that address the heat and resistance problems with 
aluminum. Copper is a much better, safer conductor. (R. 6406.) 
Use of PVC in the design and manufacture, absent an integral thermostat, was a 
design defect according to Kilgore. If the temperature is not controlled, the cable will 
reach temperatures that can degrade the PVC insulation. (R. 6406.) The use of 
clips/spacers/links, coupled with poor instructions for their use, could be expected to 
result in product abuse and cable damage, causing fires. It was a defect to supply cables 
with a clip, spacer or link that had nail holes in them because it invites use of a nail with 
the potential that the clip is not nailed before the cable is in place. (R. 6407.) 
Concerning the manufacturer's omissions, Kilgore testified that the failure to 
include an integral thermostat or thermostatic shutoff (snap-type thermostat) was a 
product defect. (R. 6407.) Not only did it allow the product to be energized above 
freezing conditions, but ongoing energization increased the product's aging and thermal 
degradation. The lack of an integral fuse plug or GFCI was a product defect When a 
ground fault short circuit occurs, it can be expected that the fault will not trip a circuit 
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breaker, resulting in sustained faulting conditions and heating. (R. 6407.) The 20 amp 
circuit breaker was an inadequate circuit protection, both for a ground fault and line 
neutral fault. Manufacturers do not make circuit breakers low enough for a standard 
residential or commercial circuit breaker panel, so the only safe way to protect the circuit 
was with both a fuse plug and a GFPD. Without a GFCI, a ground fault from the neutral 
to the braid cannot be electrically detected and interrupted by a 20 amp breaker, giving 
the fault sufficient time to start the fire. (R. 6407.) 
Second, plaintiffs put forth evidence showing how the heat caused by the electrical 
fault in the heat cable could cause the fascia board to which it was attached to ignite. 
Relying on the tests performed by Kilgore, plaintiffs' expert Dr. Babrauskas 
("Babrauskas") explained that there is a likelihood that an electrical malfunction in the 
heat cable would initiate a fire. (R. 6370-81.) Babrauskas explained if PVC is heated 
electrically by an over current of electricity, it first softens and then ignites.3 (R. 6377.) 
The ignited PVC is what caused the 436 Main fire. Babrauskas' experience is that, once 
ignited, PVC will bum for minutes at a time. (R. 6379.) Given his experience and the 
evidence in this case, Dr. Babrauskas conducted experiments to determine if the PVC 
would cause a sustained flame on the adjacent fascia board, and concluded that a 
3Kilgore conducted tests that determined the maximum possible heat that could be 
generated by a poor electrical connection. (R. 6404.) He determined that the maximum 
possible power generated by this type of electrical fault was 93 watts. (R. 6404.) His 
experiments determined that the heat was great enough to ignite available combustibles, 
i.e.,thePVC. (R.6404.) 
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sustained flame could be produced using a propane flame with the same characteristics as 
Dr. Kilgore stated would be caused by the heat cable electrical malfunction. 
(R. 6378-79.) The sustained flame continued to bum and eventually erupted into a large 
fire at 436 Main* 
Finally, Edward M. Schaefer ("Schaefer"), a forensic electrical engineer, testified 
that a ground fault protective device (GFPD) is used on equipment and appliances (hair 
dryers) to detect tiny electrical faults, and cuts the power to the appliance. (R. 7135.) 
Ground fault protection devices have been available since the early 1970s. (R. 7135.) 
Schaefer testified concerning testing he had conducted with an exemplar cable and a 
GFCL He performed a demonstration of the test in court and established that the GFCI 
with a 4-6 milliamp (a milliamp is 1/1000 of an amp) rating or a GFPD with a 15-30 
milliamp rating would have interrupted a ground fault in the cable before any fire could 
be ignited. He testified that failure to include a ground fault protection device with this 
product was a defect (R. 7135-7141), and that adding a GFCI to the cable was 
economically feasible when it was made. (R. 7142.) 
VIIL SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's findings are fatally deficient as a matter of law. Two thousand 
pages of testimony, over one hundred photographs, dozens of artifacts from the fire, and 
other evidence were reduced to a scant four pages that mentions not a witness, a line of 
testimony, a photograph, or an artifact. They are conclusory and cursory, containing no 
detail or subsidiary facts. Nor do they disclose the steps the court took to reach its 
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findings. 438 Main's due process rights to a meaningful appeal have been thwarted, for 
this Court cannot devine how the court made its findings, or whether they were properly 
supported by substantial competent evidence. The Court should reverse and remand. 
In ruling on the appellees' Rule 41(b) motion for nonsuit, the court committed 
legal error by considering only Easy Heat's evidence, rather than considering 438 Main's 
evidence to determine if they had made out a prima facie case. Had the court properly 
confined itself to appellants' evidence, it could only have denied the motion, for plaintiffs 
introduced strong evidence supporting every element of their claims. 
The court mistakenly required appellants to prove the precise mechanism of the 
cable failure. Yet this was an impossible task given that the fire itself destroyed the part 
of the cable that failed. There was overwhelming evidence as to where the fire started, 
and all other potential ignition sources, except the cable, were eliminated. The law 
requires an inference under these circumstances that a defect in the cable has been 
proven. Appellants were entitled to this inference and because the court denied the 
inference to these, it committed reversible error. 
Moreover, the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. The court 
found that the fire did not start in the southeast comer of the 436 Main building, yet that 
is where it was first seen, and where it was first fought by the person who reported the 
fire, a responding police officer, and the fire department. It is where two Fire Marshals 
said it started. It is where three professional origin and cause investigators said it started. 
It is where the physical evidence shows it started. Without explaining how or why it 
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made its decision, the court ignored this mountain of evidence, blithely concluding that 
the fire did not start in the southeast comer of the building. Yet it never explained where 
the fire did start, nor why it rejected the testimony of eye witnesses, firefighters, fire 
marshals, origin and cause experts and scientists. 
Other findings of fact are against the clear weight of the evidence, including the 
court's finding that the cable was not defective and dangerous, that there was no 
reasonably feasible alternative design that would have prevented the fire, and others as 
detailed in the Argument. 
The court improperly relied on negligence law theories in dismissing the strict 
liability claim. Doctrines of notice, state of the art, and the following of supposed 
governmental standards have no business in a strict liability case, where the sole concerns 
are whether a product is dangerously defective and whether that defect caused injury or 
damage. Applying negligence concepts to a strict liability case was clear legal error 
mandating reversal. Finally, the court erroneously granted partial summary judgment on 
appellants' warning claim in the face of genuine issues of material fact. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
A* THE FINDINGS ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT. 
The findings here are legally insufficient and this Court should grant plaintiffs a 
retrial. Once a case is tried without a jury, "the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusion of law thereon " Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis 
supplied). Utah appellate courts'"consistently stress' the importance of adequate 
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'findings of fact.'" Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The 
findings "must show that the court's judgment or decree 'flows logically from, and is 
supported by the evidence."' Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996,999 (Utah 1987) (quoting 
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423,426 (Utah 1986)). These findings should be "more than 
just cursory statements; they must 'be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached.'" Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103,1105 (Utah Ct App. 1999) 
(quoting Acton, 737 P.2d at 999) (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, "[t]he importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings... is 
essential to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law"; otherwise, "the 
reviewing function of this Court is seriously undermined." Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336,1338-39 (Utah 1979). Absent "adequate findings of fact, meaningful review of a 
decision's evidentiary basis is virtually impossible." Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477 (citing 
State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767,771 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Accordingly, the trial 
court's failure to "make findings on all material issues constitutes reversible error." 
Estate ofAshton v. Ashton, 804 P.2d 540, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Acton, 737 
P.2dat999).4 
4
 For example, failure to prepare adequate findings of fact is a "fundamental defect 
that makes it impossible to review the issues that were briefed without invading the trial 
court's fact-finding domain." Acton, 131 P.2d at 998-99 (trial court did not produce 
findings of fact). 
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Judge Thome's findings are so inadequate that it is impossible for this Court to 
review them. The findings are cursory statements that "plaintiffs failed to state a prima 
facie case." They failed to show how the court reached its final conclusion on origin and 
cause and to explain the underlying factual basis for its conclusion. 
After a seven-day trial that focused primarily on where and how the fire started, 
the trial court simply "found," "[t]he ADKS roof deicing cable was not the proximate 
cause of the fire at 436 Main " (R. 6671.)5 This Court cannot review this decision 
because it does not know how Judge Thome reached it.6 
To remedy the lack of complete findings, "the appellate court will normally 
remand the case for further proceedings." Jeffs v. Stubs, 970 P.2d 1234,1242 (Utah 
1998). However, because the trial judge is no longer available, this case must be retried. 
Acton, 131 P.2d at 999 (trial judge retired; retrial ordered). 
5The findings make no other mention of the issue of cause and origin of the fire. 
The trial court did not explain how its decision "flows logically" from the evidence 
submitted at trial; its statements are "cursory" and not "sufficiently detailed." There is no 
mention of any subsidiary facts that disclose the steps the trial court followed to reach its 
ultimate conclusion, despite the testimony of fire cause and origin experts, electrical 
engineers and a world-renowned fire scientist, and the introduction of over one hundred 
of photographs convincingly establishing the origin of this fire in the southeast comer of 
436 Main with the only possible source of ignition. 
6Even if the findings of fact were explainable by the evidence, it is not this Court's 
role to comb the record for evidence with which to bolster incomplete findings. Bailey v. 
Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 22, 52 P.3d 1158 (finding that court of appeals "assumed the role 
of fact finder and in doing so exceeded its proper role" when it relied not on the trial 
court's findings of fact, but rather on other evidence in the record). 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR NONSUIT OR DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 41(b) AT 
THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFFS' CASE ON THE GROUND THAT 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE, 
As this Court recently explained, "[R]ule 41(b) 'is appropriately applied when the 
trial judge finds that the claimant has • •. failed to make out a prima facie case or when 
the trial judge is not persuaded by the evidence presented by the claimant.'" Bair v. 
Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, J 12,20 P.3d 388 (quoting Lemon v. Coates, 735 
P.2d 58,60 (Utah 1987)) (emphasis added). 
An involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) in a bench trial is the procedural 
counterpart of a Rule 50 directed verdict in a jury trial. In re Trujillo, 2001 UT 38,24 
P.3d 972. To survive a motion for a directed verdict, the nonmoving party must simply 
present sufficient competent evidence to establish a prima facie case. That is something 
that plaintiffs in this case unquestionably did. Plaintiffs' evidence on origin, defect and 
cause, at first sight, stood on its own. 
Moreover, a plaintiff in a strict product liability action can prove product defect 
with circumstantial evidence, and need not prove exactly how a product defect caused the 
plaintiffs injury. Diez v. Waller, 685 P.2d 744,747 (Ariz. 1984).7 The Diez court cited 
7
"This would be especially true in cases such as this one where the product has 
disintegrated or burned up." Diez, 685 P.2d at 747; Skil Corp. v. Lugsdin, 309 S.E.2d 
921,924 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) ("Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish the 
existence of a manufacturing defect at the time the product left the manufacturer, even 
where the product is consumed or destroyed in the use that resulted in the plaintiffs 
injury" (citations omitted)). 
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Prosser for the proposition that the mere fact of an accident, combined with facts such as 
an occurrence within a short time of sale, elimination of other likely causes, or an 
indication that the defect existed before the sale may establish a sufficient case via a "res 
ipsa type of inference." Diez, 685 P.2d at 747 (citing W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of 
Torts § 103, pp. 672-73 (4th ed. 1971)). 
A plaintiff need not prove to an absolute certainty that nothing else could have 
possibly caused the accident, but rather must simply present enough evidence for the fact 
finder to "reasonably infer that it was more probable than not that the product was 
defective." Id. at 748. "[C]ausation may be shown by circumstantial evidence and such 
evidence need not negate all other possible cause, but nevertheless such evidence must 
exclude other reasonable hypothesis [sic] with a fair amount of certainty.'* Russell v. 
Windsor Props., Inc., 366 So. 2d 219,223 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
The court in Brothers v. General Motors Corp. articulated a "flexible standard of 
circumstantial evidence" that a plaintiff in a products liability action may use when the 
product was destroyed and no one actually witnessed the product cause the accident. 658 
P.2d 1108,1110 (Mont. 1983). This "flexible standard" can be met "by proof of the 
circumstances of the accident, similar occurrences under similar circumstances, and 
elimination of alternative causes." Id. This flexible, circumstantial approach to proof in 
products liability cases is widely accepted. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
recently explained: 
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although in both actions in negligence and breach of warranty a plaintiff 
must come forward with evidence of a defect, existence of the causative 
defect is provable with circumstantial evidence. The precise defect need 
not be named and proved; it is sufficient if the cumulation of circumstances 
and inferences . . . supports the conclusion that there was a defect which 
caused the accident. 
Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d 33,45 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted) 
(applying New York law).8 438 Main proved where the fire started and eliminated all 
ignition sources, except the cable. Cables do not normally start fires, so because this 
cable did start a fiare, it must have been defective. 438 Main was entitled to this 
inference in the context of whether it established a prima facie case. 
In its findings, the trial court refers only to plaintiffs' supposed failure to state a 
prima facie case and does not cite to any evidence submitted by defendants prior to 
plaintiffs' resting. Thus, the extent to which the court looked outside plaintiffs' evidence 
cannot be discovered in the findings. Yet, defendants rely on an anomalous holding that a 
trial judge can justifiably consider more than just the plaintiffs evidence when ruling on a 
Rule 41(b) motion, even though no one knows what the trial court relied upon. See 
Desert Livestock v. Utah Power & Light Co., 541 P.2d 1111,1113 (Utah 1975). In 
Desert Livestock, the trial judge withheld his decision on a Rule 41(b) motion until the 
BSee also Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 
1972) (applying Missouri law) (fire and crash of plane lost at sea did not require proof of 
specific defect); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 502 N.E.2d 651 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1985) (plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to show existence of defect); 
Anderson v. Chrysler Corp., 403 S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1991) (plaintiff need not identify the 
specific defect that caused the harm). 
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defendant had introduced all its evidence and rested its case. Id. The trial judge then 
granted the motion to dismiss. Id. The Court emphasized that the trial judge had 
discretion to withhold ruling on the Rule 41(b) motion until the close of evidence: 
Having done all this, particularly in withholding action on the motion to 
dismiss, we believe the judge was not only justified in granting the motion 
under Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but exercised a discretion 
reserved to himself irrespective of such rule. All of which leads us to 
conclude that plaintiffs' Points I and II on appeal, having to do with 
plaintiffs' urgence that the trial court was required to look solely at the 
plaintiffs' evidence in acting on the motion, is without merit. 
Id. Thus, the focus of the Court's analysis was on whether the Rule 41(b) permits a trial 
judge, in his discretion, to withhold action on a Rule 41(b) motion until the close of all 
the evidence. See id. 
The result of this conclusion is that the trial judge in a bench trial can use her 
discretion to either (1) rule on the Rule 41(b) motion immediately at the close of 
plaintiffs evidence, thereby making a judgment about whether the plaintiffs evidence on 
its own establishes a prima facie case; or (2) withhold ruling on the Rule 41(b) motion 
until the close of all evidence, thereby using the entirety of the defendant's evidence to 
determine whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. There is no question 
that this was the Court's holding, and there is no question that it was wrong. 
The court in Desert Livestock did not explain how Rule 41(b) permits this result, 
or cite case law supporting its conclusion. See id. More seriously, however, it did not 
explain how a defendant's evidence could possibly be relevant to the question of whether 
a plaintiff has established a prima facie case—that is, a case that stands on its own. The 
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trial court should have only considered whether 438 Main introduced evidence of a prima 
facie case. Because 438 Main did establish a prima facie case, the trial court should have 
denied the Rule 41(b) motion.9 
C. THE FINDINGS WERE AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE. 
Even assuming the court's findings were legally sufficient and this Court could 
uncover what the trial court relied upon, this Court should grant plaintiffs a new triaL 
The court's finding that the heat cable was not the proximate cause of the fire is clearly 
erroneous and against the weight of the evidence. The marshaling10 process is a reminder 
that "broad deference [is] owed to the fact finder at trial." Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477. 
However, the Court "grants this deference [only] when the findings of fact are sufficiently 
detailed to disclose the evidential basis for the court's decision." Id. After marshaling, 
the appellant "must demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light most favorable to 
9Because plaintiffs have made a prima facie case that the cable caused the fire, 
Melva Garcia should still be a party to the case. The trial court found that Melva Garcia 
had no duty of care to ensure the cable's toggle switch was off, but that even if she did 
have a duty, there was no prima facie case. Thus, because the trial court erred in finding 
no prima facie case, there remains the issue of Melva Garcia's duty. As explained in 
Section IX, G. of this Argument, Melva Garcia did have a duty of care. 
10
 Appellants contend "[t]here is, in effect no need for [them] to marshal the 
evidence when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully 
challenged as factual determinations." Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474,477 (Utah Ct 
App. 1991); see also Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103,1105 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999) (holding appellant "need not engage in a futile marshaling exercise" because they 
can demonstrate the findings as framed by the trial court "are legally insufficient"). 
Appellants can only guess what evidence the trial court relied upon, but they will marshal 
the evidence to provide meaningful review of the findings. 
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(he trial court, the evidence is insufficient to support the challenged finding," Wardley 
Better Homes and Garden v. Cannon, 21 P.3d 235,238 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), rev9don 
other grounds, 2002 UT 99. 
The findings here, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Order 
granting nonsuit, are erroneous because: (1) there was insufficient, if any, evidence to 
support the finding that the origin was not in the southeast corner; and (2) there was 
insufficient evidence to support the finding that the heat cable did not cause the fire. 
1. Defendants9 Origin Evidence. 
Easy Heat's experts testified the area with the most fire damage was the origin of 
this fire, that the southeast comer did not have the heaviest burn,11 and that the fire started 
in the show room attic. (Tr.t. 1521; R. 7306; Tr.t. 1457; R. 7298; Tr.t. 1823; R. 7361; 
Tr.t 1420; R. 7294.) Easy Heat also claimed it could not adequately document the 
precise location of the origin of the fire because the building was demolished before it 
had a chance to investigate the scene.12 (Tr.t. 1460; R. 7299; Tr.t. 1525; R.7307.) 
Defendants explained that the southeast comer still had "an available fuel load" 
and that had the fire originated at the exterior, the expert would have expected to see 
11There was some dispute concerning whether the area with the greatest fire 
damage was the southeast comer of the storage room. {Compare Blundell Tr.t. 753-54 
with Russell Tr.t. 1423-24; R. 7294.) Maybe the trial court found the area of origin to be 
the area with the most fire damage based on the testimony presented by Defendants' 
experts, but this was never explained in the findings. 
"Plaintiffs had difficulty learning the identity of the manufacturer of the cable 
because the cable itself did not identify the manufacturer. (Tr.t. 180; R. 7112.) 
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more damage to the end of the roof joists. (Tr.t. 1428; R. 7361.) Another expert testified 
the roof joists near the point of origin "should have been folly consumed." (Tr.t. 1823; R. 
7361.) Defense experts saw "the rafters were more fire damaged towards the [uphill] 
interior of the shed rather than towards the edge" and if the fire starts "at the exterior, the 
greatest damage to the rafters should occur adjacent to the wall, and that damage should 
then diminish as you go further towards the interior of the building." (Tr.t. 1826; R. 
7362.) Maybe the trial court relied on this testimony in deciding that the fire did not start 
in the southeast comer of the building, although this was never explained in the findings. 
(R. 6670-72.) 
Maybe the trial court based its finding on proximate cause on defendants' claim 
that plaintiffs could not prove the precise area of origin. Given that the fire completely 
destroyed the "precise" area of origin—the fascia board over chases 1 and 2 to which the 
cable was nailed—the precise origin could not be proved to an absolute certainty. 438 
Main's experts described the location of the origin of the fire as: a three dimensional cube 
area in the southeast comer, (Tr.t. 203; R. 7078), "the southeast comer on the exterior of 
the building just below the roof level" (Tr.t. 325; R. 7106.), and the "area of origin" 
defined in this fire is an area two or three feet in diameter. (Tr.t. 799; R. 7188.) Based on 
this evidence, defendants argued, and the trial court may have agreed, plaintiffs' had not 
met a burden to show the "precise" area of origin. 
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2. Defendants9 Cause Evidence. 
Defendants' expert Dr. Ogle testified that the fault explained by Kilgore was 
insufficient to ignite the PVC. He contended that the flame test used by Kilgore to ignite 
the fascia board was not representative of the actual electrical fault. (Tr.t. 1832; R. 7362; 
Tr.t. 1837; R. 7363.) He said the test was not representative of the actual conditions of 
the fascia board when it was attached to the building, and that Kilgore's heat lamp was 
placed above the fascia board in a manner inconsistent with the conditions of ordinary 
sunlight. (Tr.t 1842-43; R. 7364.) 
Ogle concluded the electrical fault and ignition of the PVC claimed by the 
plaintiffs would not generate enough heat to ignite the fascia board. (Tr.t. 1848; R. 7364; 
Tr.t. 1849; R. 7365; Tr.t. 1853; R. 7365.) He explained that a three-inch kitchen match 
produces approximately 100 watts of energy, which is comparable to the level shown by 
Kilgore to be the expected energy of an electrical fault in the heat cable. (Tr.t. 1832; R. 
7362.) However, Ogle believed the actual temperature of the match would be higher than 
what he would expect of the electrical fault claimed by plaintiffs. (Tr.t. 1832; R. 7362.) 
Due to the "heat sink" effect the match would not be able to ignite the wood fascia, and 
consequently neither would the electrical fault. (Tr.t. 1849; R. 7365.) Ogle had tried to 
light the board with 30 matches and could not get the board to ignite. Basically, he 
hypothesized the flame suggested by Kilgore and Babrauskas could not ignite the whole 
fascia board. (Tr.t 1849; R. 7365.) 
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Additionally, Easy Heat contended the PVC was not a good ignition source. (Tr.t 
1807; R. 7359.) Ogle testified that the PVC is naturally flame retardant and reluctant to 
burn. (Id.) Every time he tried the flame test on the PVC, it extinguished when he took 
the heat source away. (Tr.t. 1833; R. 7363.) (This made no sense because the burning 
cable was attached to the fascia board, and not taken away.) He also testified that PVC 
would not bum for more than sixty seconds. (Tr.t. 1840-41; R. 7363-64.) He explained 
that PVC absorbs energy when it begins to bum and does not generate it. (Tr.t. 1829; R. 
7362.) If the heat source is taken away, PVC will not continue to bum. (Tr.t. 1829; R. 
7362; Tr.t. 1581; R. 7314.) The sustained flame plaintiffs produced in the laboratory tests 
could not produce the type of source that caused this fire. (Tr.t. 1860; R. 7366.) 
Easy Heat also introduced testimony from expert Robert Becherer, an electrical 
engineer. He explained that GFCIs were not required by the National Electric Code, 
(Tr.t. 1568; R. 7312), and that a GFCI would not have been cost effective, as its cost was 
more than the product itself. (Tr.t. 1571; R. 7313.) He bolstered the standards used by 
the Canadian Standards Association and explained that the tests it runs were thorough and 
complete. (Tr.t. 1577; R. 7313.) 
Finally, defendants questioned the credibility of plaintiffs' experts. First, Becherer 
criticized the testing methods used by Kilgore (Tr.t. 1584-1606, R. 7314-16.) Russell 
testified that plaintiffs' experts had failed to preserve evidence (Tr.t. 1412-13; R. 7293), 
had failed to follow appropriate scientific methods in examining the fire scene (Tr.t. 
1461-62; R. 7299), and had failed to document the scene at its demolition. (Tr.t. 1457; R. 
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7288; Tr.t 7299; R. 1460.) He also testified plaintiffs had focused their investigation 
from the beginning on the heat cable and ignored other possible causes, even though there 
were none. 
3. Evidence Supporting a Finding that the Fire Did Not Originate 
in the Southeast Corner of 438 Main Is Insufficient 
The trial court committed reversible error when it found the origin of the fire was 
not the southeast comer of the 436 Main building. This finding is against the clear weight 
of the evidence. Plaintiffs submitted overwhelming eyewitness and expert evidence of 
the fire's origin in the southeast comer of 436 Main. Defendants suggested an alternative 
but not precise origin of the fire, with insufficient evidence to support this claim. 
Origin and cause expert witness Mr. Russell opined that the fire probably began in 
the attic above the show room. (Tr.t. 1521; R. 7306.) He said that the fire would have to 
have been started by an electrical fault. (Tr.t. 1522; R. 7306.) This is against the clear 
weight of the evidence, because he admitted that no other breakers had tripped except for 
the breaker that controlled the heat cable. (Tr.t. 1522; R. 7306.) There was power to the 
building until after the first truck arrived, as Lt. Bums had seen the UP&L supply line to 
the 436 building snap and arc some minutes after he arrived. (Tr.t. 133; R. 7069.) Had 
the fire started in the attic, it would have burned up and out, according to Mr. Russell. 
(Tr.t. 1528; R. 7307.) Had the fire started there, it would have first been seen either on 
the Main Street side of the 436 building, or through the show room roof. (Tr.t. 732-33; R. 
7167.) This is against the clear weight of the evidence because Mr. Russell's theory 
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ignores the fact that fire fighter Lee Terry, one of the first fighters on the scene, cut a vent 
hole in the show room roof, but did not see any fire in the attic. (Tr.t. 1539; R. 7309.) 
There was no fire at Mr. Russell's area of origin. Finally, no fire broke through the attic 
of the show room until an hour and a half into the fire. (Tr.t. 135; R. 7070.) 
Mr. Russell admitted that the first place the fire was seen was in the southeast 
comer of the 436 building. Therefore, in order for him to be correct about the fire starting 
in the attic, the following would have had to happen before it was seen first at the 
southeast comer: the fire would have to travel through the east exterior wall of the attic 
(Tr.t. 1527,1534-35; R. 7307-7308); it would then have to bum through the dead space. 
(Tr.t. 1534-35; R. 7308); while in the dead space, it would have free to bum to the north 
and into the 438 building. Id. Then the fire would have to bum down and between the 
roof chases of the storage room; (Tr.t. 1535-36; R. 7308.); next it would have to bum 
through a forty-five minute rated sheet rock fire stop in the very eastern edge of the roof 
chases, meaning that it would take half an hour to forty-five minutes for fire to bum 
through the sheet rock. (Tr.t. 1535-36; R. 7308.) Finally, it would have to bum through 
the fascia board. (Tr.t. 1536; R. 7308.) 
Under Mr. Russell's theory, the fire would have to bum down instead of up, and 
through an exterior wall of the attic, down through the dead space, continuing down hill 
through the chases, through the sheet rock fire stop, and the fascia board, before anybody 
saw it. (Tr.t. 1538; R. 7308.) This did not happen. 
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In the end, Easy Heat's evidence could not rebut plaintiffs' evidence, and its 
theory was firmly refuted by Mr. Russell's own cross-examination, by extensive, 
consistent eyewitness testimony and the testimony of five origin and cause officials and 
experts. The only conclusion as to origin supported by evidence is that it started in the 
southeast comer of the 436 Main building.13 
Defendant's theory that the southeast comer of 438 Main was not the area of origin 
because another area sustained more damage is also refuted by how this fire was fought. 
In this case, "[initially somebody fought the fire with buckets of water at the back of the 
building, which would have slowed down the progress of the fire at that particular point 
or the point of origin. And as the fire progresses on, the firefighters come in and they 
attack a certain area. That slows down the process at the back of the building." (Tr.t. 
"Determining the area of origin is not a precise science. (Tr.t. 799; R. 7188; Tr.t 
815; R. 7191; Tr.t. 1539; R. 7309.) Plaintiffs put forth substantial expert testimony 
narrowing the area of origin to a small area in the southeast comer. Admittedly, plaintiffs 
did not prove a precise "point of origin" down to the square inch. (Tr.t. 816; R. 7191.) 
Foley, however, located the probable point of origin as the clip that affixed the cable to 
the fascia board "9 inches below the roof," near the roof joist between the first and second 
chase. (Exh. 91.) Once the area of origin was determined by four independent 
investigators, these investigators looked for a cause in that area. (Tr.t. 235; R. 7082; R. 
6387.) It is undisputed that plaintiffs' experts eliminated all possible causes of the fire in 
the southeast comer, except the heat cable. (Tr.t. 371; R. 7111.); see also (Tr.t. 1475; R. 
7301) (defense experts agree that plaintiffs' expert eliminated all other ignition sources in 
the southeast comer during the cause and origin investigation). The only heat source in 
that area was the heat cable. (Tr.t. 792; R. 7188.) There was no need to determine, down 
to the inch, the fire's exact origin at that point. Nothing else could have started the fire. 
Even if viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the evidence does not 
support the finding that the heat cable was not the proximate cause of the fire. Plaintiffs 
met the burden of proof: more likely than not. Indeed, plaintiffs' evidence would satisfy 
an even higher burden of proof. 
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622-25; R. 7153.) Furthermore, experts testified that the efforts of the firefighters and 
those first arriving on the scene extinguished the exterior fire at the southeast comer. 
This phenomenon was described in an analogy used by plaintiffs' experts: 
Well, I think the example we were using was a garbage can in the comer of 
the room... if we build a fire in this room we'd expect to see patterns that 
would indicate that's the point of origin. But the other thing that can 
happen is depending on our fuel loads in this particular room, if I have a 
greater fuel load in that comer, I could have far more damage in that comer 
that I can have where the fire originates because there's more fuel to bum. 
It may bum for a longer period of time if it does not get suppressed in that 
comer. If I put it out here before it gets big, then we're going to have more 
damage at the point of origin. (Tr.t. 791-92; R. 7187-88.) 
The type of construction of the 436 Main building also influenced the way the fire 
spread. From the point of origin, the fire spread up through the roof structure in a 
concealed space. That space is not protected by fire sprinklers. Once the fire reached the 
concealed spaces and the dead space the fire suppression efforts could not reach it, 
allowing it to bum much longer in the dead space in the attic area above the showroom. 
Firefighters on the scene testified they had difficulty fighting the fire in the area above the 
showroom because of the multiple layers of metal ceiling. This was not a problem in the 
storage area near the southeast comer, where the fire was quickly extinguished. This 
allowed the fire to bum longer in the attic area above the showroom floor, causing more 
damage in that area than was caused at the area of origin. 
Maybe the court based its decision on the testimony of defendants' expert 
witnesses, but the findings do not reveal it. 
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4. Evidence to Support the Finding that the Heat Cable Was Not 
the Cause of the 436 Main Fire Is Insufficient 
The trial court committed reversible error when it found the heat cable was not the 
proximate cause of the fire. There is overwhelming substantial evidence that the heat 
cable caused this fire. All of the cause and origin experts who investigated the fire scene 
came to the same independent solution conclusion—the heat cable caused this fire. 
Defendants did not suggest an alternative cause of the fire, except that it was likely 
"electrical." Even defense experts agreed that all sources of ignition in the plaintiffs' area 
of origin, except the heat cable, were eliminated. (Tr.t. 1475; R. 7301.) This point is 
critical: if plaintiffs were right about the origin of the fire, all parties agree concerning the 
cause in that area. 
Through expert testimony, plaintiffs submitted a logical and scientifically 
supported and documented explanation of how the heat cable caused this fire. A stress 
occurred at the thirty-two inch mark of the heat cable. This was likely caused by the 
overdriving of the nail used to attach the cable to the fascia board, as researched in other 
locations on the cable. The electrical fault caused the cable to heat up, creating oxidation 
and poor connection, and greater heat over time, eventually igniting the PVC. The PVC 
continued to bum and ignited the fascia board. Once the fascia board was ignited, the fire 
quickly spread uphill into the building. 
Admittedly, the parties' experts gave conflicting testimony on this point. 
However, the conflicting expert testimony is insignificant because plaintiffs produced 
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overwhelming evidence of the fire's origin. Nothing else could have logically ignited this 
fire. Maybe the court based its decision on the testimony of defendants' expert witnesses, 
but the findings do not reveal it. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
EVALUATING A STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM USING 
NEGLIGENCE CONCEPTS. 
When the trial court's Rule 41(b) dismissed appellants' case, it primarily relied on 
three negligence-based doctrines: (1) that the deicing cable complied with government 
standards; (2) that the deicing cable was "state of the art"; and (3) that Heron and Easy 
Heat had not had prior notice of the cable's potential fire danger (R. 6670-72, ffi[ 2,11-
15). While relevant to the issue of negligence, these doctrines are all irrelevant in a strict 
products liability case. This Court should join the chorus of courts around the country 
that have held it improper for a trial court to use negligence concepts to evaluate a strict 
liability claim. 
Non-negligence is not a defense to a strict liability claim. When this court adopted 
the definition of strict liability in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 610 P.2d 152, 
158 (Utah 1979), and Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it held that 
"there are two defenses to strict products liability": first, that the consumer misused the 
product, and second, assumption of the risk. 
The trial court's consideration of whether the cable complies with government 
standards was also fatally flawed because the court misunderstood the government 
standards at issue. Easy Heat argued that because the National Electric Code (NEC) is 
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adopted in the Uniform Building Standards Act (UBSA), it is a government standard for 
purposes of assessing the methods and techniques of manufacturing defendants' cable. 
This is not pursuasive because UBSA, Utah Code Ann. § 58-56-1, et seq., expressly 
applies only to "building construction, alteration, remodeling and repair." Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-56-4(2),14 and the NEC is not a products code. Thus, despite the fact that Utah 
has not adopted the NEC as a government standard for products, defendants argued that 
the NEC provided blanket coverage for any and all products used in or around buildings. 
Under this reasoning, any person injured by any product in conformity with NEC 
standards and found in, or attached to, any building in the state, must overcome a 
presumption that the product was non-defective. At the same time, parties injured by 
other products would carry no such burden. This inconsistent result and defendants' 
massive presumption is unsupported by any indication that the legislature intended such a 
sweeping effect when it adopted the NEC for the limited purpose of establishing building 
code specifications. It was legal error for the court to have considered the NEC. 
Evidence that a defendant did not have notice of a product design defect is a 
negligence concept, and therefore irrelevant to this strict liability suit. "[P]roof that the 
manufacturer knew or should have known of the defective condition... [is] unnecessary 
under strict liability." Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, f 13. Easy Heat argued that 
14It is not a product code, nor does it establish standards for assessing conformity 
with methods for any kind of product, as required for the presumption under the Products 
Liability Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6. 
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the notice evidence was relevant to show that the cable was not unreasonably dangerous. 
The notice evidence in this case, however, merely showed that defendants were unaware 
of prior fires caused by the deicing cable. It said nothing about the technical merits of the 
cable's design or the feasibility of incorporating a GFCI, and therefore its only relevance 
was to show that defendants were not negligent. Consequently, the notice evidence was 
irrelevant because it focused on whether defendants "knew or should have known of the 
defective condition." Id. 
The trial court's consideration of state of the art evidence injected negligence 
principles that are irrelevant to strict products liability. Easy Heat has ably pointed out 
that more courts have found state of the art evidence to be relevant to strict liability 
claims than have found it irrelevant. This court has not spoken on the issue, but should 
find state of the art evidence irrelevant in strict liability actions, because: 1) it says more 
about the alleged reasonableness of defendants' conduct than whether the cable was 
properly designed; and 2) it erodes the principles this Court sought to protect when it 
adopted strict liability doctrine. 
Courts decide whether state of the art evidence involves negligence principles by 
asking whether it "speaks to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct." Norton 
v. Snapper Power Equip., 806 F.2d 1545,1549 (11th Cir. 1987). State of the art evidence 
that bears on whether the manufacturer behaved reasonably is irrelevant to strict liability: 
"[P]roof that the defective condition of the product was the result of negligence in the 
manufacturing process . . . is unnecessary under strict liability." Bishop, 2002 UT at \ 13. 
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See also Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., 36 F.3d 278,285-86 (3d Cir. 1994), cert, 
denied, 514 U.S. 1003 (1995) (finding state of the art evidence "absolutely irrelevant" in 
products liability claim under Pennsylvania law). Only if the evidence speaks to the 
"feasibility of alternative designs" do some courts find it "relevant to whether the product 
was 'unreasonably' dangerous," and hold that it can be considered in strict liability 
contexts. See Norton, 806 F.2d at 1549. 
The state of the art evidence in this case spoke more to the reasonableness of 
Heron's and Easy Heat's behavior than to the feasibility of an alternative design for the 
roof deicing cable. This conclusion comports with a definition of "state of the art" that 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied. As the court in Smith v. Minster Machine 
Co. explained, "If state of the art is understood to mean simply the custom and practice in 
an industry, and as we view it, this is a proper meaning to be attributed to it, then 
compliance with such standard does not constitute an absolute defense to a products 
liability action." 669 F.2d 628,633 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying Oklahoma law) (emphasis 
added). Thus, the Tenth Circuit has defined state of the art evidence as bearing on 
whether a manufacturer's behavior conformed to industry norms—a classic negligence 
analysis, and therefore irrelevant to a strict liability claim. The court should do so here. 
This Court should not allow negligence principles to infiltrate strict liability claims 
under cover of "state of the art" evidence. The Missouri Supreme Court has explained 
why it makes sense not to consider state of the art evidence in the context of a strict 
liability claim: "The manufacturer's standard of care is irrelevant because it relates to the 
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reasonableness of the manufacturer's design choice; fault is an irrelevant consideration on 
the issue of liability in the strict liability context," Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 
S,W.2d434,438(Mo. 1984). The Supreme Court of Hawaii agrees: "Although highly 
relevant to a negligence action, [state of the art evidence] has absolutely no bearing on the 
elements of a strict liability claim," Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 
549 (Haw. 1987) (citing Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337,1341 (9th Cir. 
1986)). Evidence bearing on the reasonableness of the defendants' behavior is "of 
absolutely no moment" in a strict liability case, and considering such evidence would 
"emasculate the [strict liability] doctrine and would in a very real way signal a return to 
negligence theory." Cunningham v. MacNeal Mem 7 Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897,902,903 
Gil. 1970). 
This Court should not permit the use of state-of-the-art evidence to emasculate 
strict liability doctrine. Justice Wilkins, quoting Justice Traynor of the California 
Supreme Court, emphasized that the reason for strict liability is "'to insure that the costs 
of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such 
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect 
themselves.'" Earnest W. Hahn, 601 P.2d at 156 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Prods., Inc., 311 P.2d 897,901 (Cai. 1962)). By considering state of the art evidence, 
and the other negligence concepts, the trial court neutered strict liability doctrine, and 
undermined the law this Court laid down in Earnest W. Hahn. This was harmful error 
and on this basis alone the court should reverse. 
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F. THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE WARNINGS CLAIM 
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR, 
BECAUSE THE CABLE INSTALLER REVIEWED AND RELIED 
ON THE WARNINGS. 
"Summary judgment should be granted only if there has been a showing 'that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.'" Booth v. Attorneys' Title Guar. Fund, 2001 UT 13, \ 28, 
20 P.3d 319 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This Court therefore reviews a grant of 
summary judgment for correctness. Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97,102 (Utah 1992) 
(citations omitted). 
The trial court mistakenly granted defendants' motion for partial summary 
judgment on the warnings claim even though the warnings claim was the subject of a 
genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs presented evidence that the cable installer looked 
at and relied on the warnings. 
Although the trial court did not explain its reasons for dismissing the warnings 
claim on partial summary judgment (R. 4024), defendants' entire argument for summary 
judgment on the warnings claim was that nobody relied on the warnings because nobody 
thoroughly "read" them, and therefore the warnings could not have been a proximate 
cause of the fire. (R. 3872-74.) This argument unnecessarily presupposes that people 
must thoroughly read warnings in order to rely on them. 
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Mr, Fowler, the man who actually installed the cable, absolutely did look over the 
warnings. His deposition establishes that while he did not read them with exacting 
scrutiny, he did look at and rely on them: 
Q: Did you read the instruction at all at any time before or 
after putting the cable up? 
A: Before I always go through it roughly and skim over it, 
I guess you would say. 
Q: Yes. Did you skim over this one too? 
A: Yes, I would have. 
Q: What are you looking for when you skim over it? 
A: Just to make sure that I don't make any mistakes, the 
way they want it put up, the way it should be used and 
the way the clips that are in the box are used. 
(R. 3901) Thus, even though Mr. Fowler did not read warnings with cautious scrutiny, 
his statements prove that he did review and rely upon them. That represents a substantial 
issue of fact, and it was therefore legal error for the trial court to dismiss the warnings 
claim on partial summary judgment. 
G. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH MELVA GARCIA'S 
DUTY. 
Plaintiffs established Melva Garcia's duty through the facts that (1) she owned 436 
Main; (2) she had the cable installed (R. 6121); (3) the cable was installed with a toggle 
switch; (4) the toggle switch was left in the "on" position; and (5) Melva Garcia 
improperly delegated her responsibilities to tenants. (R. 6115.) 
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X. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the court should reverse and remand for trial on the merits. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of October, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
E&L 
Andrew M. Morse 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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John A. Anderson (4464) 
D. Matthew Moscon (6947) 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-4904 
Telephone: (801) 328-3131 
Attorneys for Defendants Easy Heat. Inc. 
and Heron Cable Industries 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
438 MAIN PARTNERSHIP, a Utah 
general partnership, RAINBOW TROUT 
INC., dba POP JENK'S a Utah 
Corporation; and TRIPLE EAGLE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EASY HEAT, INC., a Delaware 
corporation; HERON CABLE 
INDUSTRIES, a Canadian corporation; PK 
SUPPLY, a California corporation; 
ALPINE ELECTRIC, INC., a Utah 
corporation; DESERET ROOFING, a Utah 
corporation; MELVA GARCIA, a resident 
of the State of Arizona; DION HALE, a 
resident of the State of Utah; and 
QUALITY INTERIORS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 94 090 8182 
Civil No. 95 090 0287 PD 
Civil No. 95 090 1841 PD 
Judge William A. Thome 
(Consolidated Cases) 
SakUke-122S07 I 0033631-00001 
Two of the three consolidated actions (Civil Nos. 94 090 8182 and 95 090 1841PD) 
were tried to the court beginning on May 22, 2000. Plaintiffs 438 Main Partnership, Triple 
Eagle, Inc., Rainbow Trout, Inc., dba Pop Jenk's, were represented by Andrew M. Morse, 
Richard A. Van Wagoner, and Julianne Blanch of Snow, Christensen & Martineau; plaintiff 
Szechwan Chinese Restaurant was represented by Mary Pat Cashman of Lehman, Jensen & 
Donohue; defendant Melva Garcia was represented by George T. Naegle, of Richards, Brandt, 
Miller & Nelson; and defendants Easy Heat, Inc. and Heron Cable Industries, Ltd. (nka Easy 
Heat, Ltd.) were represented by John A. Anderson and D. Matthew Moscon of Stoel Rives, 
LLP. 
Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, evidence in this matter was taken by oral 
testimony, written exhibits and by written proffer substantiated by deposition testimony or 
other competent evidence. Pursuant to a further stipulation of the parties, defendants began to 
present evidence prior to plaintiffs resting their respective cases, reserving their rights to move 
for a nonsuit at the close of plaintiffs' cases. Defendants each moved for a nonsuit at the close 
of plaintiffs' cases. 
Defendant Melva Garcia's ("Garcia") motion for nonsuit was granted in both cases on 
all claims for relief asserted against her. The court reserved for further briefing Garcia's 
request for reimbursement of her attorneys' fees. The court initially denied in part and granted 
in part Easy Heat and Heron Cable's motion for nonsuit. The court initially denied the motion 
to the extent it requested a nonsuit on the grounds that plaintiffs had failed to prove by a 
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preponderance of the evidence the origin and cause of the fire. The court granted the motion 
as it related to plaintiffs' failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the roof 
deicing cable at issue in the lawsuit was unreasonably dangerous in design. The court granted 
plaintiffs leave to argue the question of whether this decision left any viable negligence claim 
against Easy Heat and Heron Cable. 
At the continued hearing on defendants' respective motions for nonsuit, the court 
confirmed that the motions were effective as to plaintiff Szechwan Chinese Restaurant as well 
as the remaining plaintiffs in these consolidated actions. After hearing further argument from 
the parties relating to Easy Heat and Heron Cable's motion for nonsuit, the court granted the 
motion as to all claims for relief on the grounds that plaintiffs had failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the product was unreasonably dangerous and plaintiffs 
failed to allege or prove an independent basis for a claim of negligence against Easy Heat and 
Heron. Upon further consideration of the evidence, the court further ruled that the plaintiffs 
had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the origin of the fire was at or near 
the subject roof deicing cable or that the cable caused the fire. 
Pursuant to Rules 41(b) and 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and in furtherance 
of the court's order granting the motions for nonsuit, including the findings and conclusions 
expressed at the hearings of this matter which are incorporated herein by reference, the court 
hereby enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
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Findings of Fact 
1. In or about September 1991, Melva Garcia retained Deseret/Moon Roofing, a 
licensed Utah roofing contractor, to purchase and install a roof deicing cable at the rear of her 
building located at 436 Main Street in Park City, Summit County, State of Utah. 
2. Deseret/Moon Roofing was responsible for selecting and purchasing an 
appropriate roof deicing. cable and related equipment, and installing the same at 436 Main. 
Deseret/Moon Roofing purchased and installed an ADKS model of roof deicing cable 
described more particularly below. 
3. At or about the same time, Garcia retained Alpine Electric, a licensed Utah 
electrical contracting firm, to install electrical service and related equipment dedicated to use 
of the roof deicing cable. Alpine Electric was responsible for selecting the appropriate 
equipment and installing the same at 436 Main. 
4. Garcia's tenant at 436 Main, Quality Interiors, through its duly authorized 
representative, Kerry Hale, thereafter agreed to be responsible for operation and maintenance 
of the roof deicing cable. Quality Interiors knew that the cable was not to be energized except 
at appropriate times when ice and snow were melting on the roof. Quality Interiors did not 
expect Garcia to turn the cable on and off, nor did it expect Garcia to call to remind them to 
turn the cable on and off. 
5. Plaintiffs allege that Melva Garcia, her ex-husband or her son-in-law may have 
affixed the heating portion of the roof deicing cable to the rear (east) trim board, fascia or 
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siding of 436 Main. Plaintiffs put on no credible evidence that Garcia, her ex-husband or her 
son-in-law were responsible for affixing the cable to the rear of the 436 Main building in such 
a manner. Plaintiffs put on no credible evidence that Garcia, her ex-husband or her son-in-law 
in any other way altered the roof deicing cable. 
6. In the early morning hours of June 15, 1993, a fire was reported at 436 Main. 
Plaintiffs alleged this fire originated at and was caused by Easy Heat and Heron Cable's ADKS 
model of roof deicing cable. 
7. The fire caused substantial damage both to the 436 Main and 438 Main 
buildings in Park City. 
8. Plaintiff 438 Main Partnership was the owner of the 438 Main building which it 
subleased in its entirety to Triple Eagle, Inc. Triple Eagle sublet the main and partial second 
floor to Szechwan Chinese Restaurant, together with a space in the basement. Triple Eagle let 
the remaining basement space of 438 Main, together with basement space under 436 Main, to 
Rainbow Trout, dba Pop Jenk's. 
9. Prior to trial, the claims of Melva Garcia, the insured loss of Pop Jenk's, and 
the claims of Quality Interiors as a cross-claimant (Civil No. 95 090 0287PD) were resolved 
through settlement. Prior to trial, the claims of the 438 Main plaintiffs and SCR against 
defendants Alpine Electric, Deseret/Moon Roofing and Quality Interiors were resolved through 
settlement and dismissed subject to those parties remaining on the verdict form for 
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apportionment purposes only. The claims of 438 Main plaintiffs and SCR against PK Supply 
were dismissed with prejudice but without a settlement. 
10. The ADKS roof deicing cable installed at 436 Main was manufactured by Heron 
Cable in June 1989. It was thereafter sold by Heron Cable to Easy Heat. Easy Heat then 
packaged the cable in its own box, provided its own written instructions for the installation, 
use and maintenance of the cable and provided the installation hardware. Easy Heat thereafter 
sold the cable to an unidentified party from whom it was purchased, directly or indirectly, by 
Deseret/Moon Roofing. 
11. The ADKS brand of roof deicing cable had been certified by the Canadian 
Standards Association ("CSA") continuously since 1967, and was periodically retested to 
maintain that listing. 
12. At the time of its manufacture and installation, the subject ADKS roof deicing 
cable was CSA listed. 
13. At the time of its manufacture and installation, the ADKS roof deicing cable 
complied with all requirements of Article 426 of the National Electrical Code ("NEC") 
regarding such products. 
14. At the time of its manufacture and installation, the subject roof deicing cable 
was state-of-the-art. 
15. The subject fire in June 1993 was the first fire reportedly involving an ADKS 
brand of roof deicing cable. 
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16. Other models and designs of roof deicing cable and pipe heating cable are 
sufficiently different than ADKS cable that fires allegedly associated with such products do not 
establish a significant risk of harm that would warrant redesign of ADKS cable. 
17. Plaintiffs failed to establish by a preponderance of competent evidence that the 
alternative designs proposed by them were both economically and technologically feasible at 
the time of manufacture or installation of the subject roof deicing cable. 
18. The design of the roof deicing cable was not defective in the absence of the 
design alternatives proposed by plaintiffs in that, among other things, the product was not 
dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by an ordinary and prudent 
buyer, consumer or user of the ADKS roof deicing cable in the relevant community 
considering ADKS' characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers, and uses. 
19. Garcia retained licensed professionals to select appropriate equipment for 
installation at 436 Main, to install the equipment together with any additional safety features 
the professionals deemed appropriate, and to install electrical service dedicated to the ADKS 
cable together with any additional safety equipment such professionals deemed necessary. 
20. The ADKS roof deicing cable was not the proximate cause of the fire at 436 
Main and, therefore, not the proximate cause of damage to any of the plaintiffs. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The ADKS roof deicing cable was not the proximate cause of the fire at 436 
Main and, therefore, not the proximate cause of damage to any of the plaintiffs. 
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2. The design of the ADKS roof deicing cable was not defective as defined by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-15-6. The cable was not unreasonably dangerous as defmed therein because, 
among other things, plaintiffs failed to establish an unreasonable risk of harm arising from the 
cable as designed, the cable met or exceeded CSA listing requirements, the cable met or 
exceeded NEC requirements, the cable was state-of-the-art, the same design of ADKS cable 
later met UL listing requirements, and this was the first fire reported with the ADKS cable 
despite approximately 30 years of prior use. Plaintiffs also failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that ADKS roof deicing cable was dangerous to an extent 
beyond which would be contemplated by an ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of 
the product in the relevant community at the time of its manufacture or installation considering 
ADKS' characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers, and uses. 
3. Easy Heat and Heron were not negligent in the design, manufacture or sale of 
the ADKS roof deicing cable. 
4. Easy Heat and Heron Cable did not breach any warranties, express or implied, 
with respect to the design, manufacture or sale of the ADKS roof deicing cable for the same 
reasons that the cable was not defective in design. 
5. Plaintiffs failed to establish a duty on the part of Garcia to call her tenants to 
remind them to turn off the roof deicing cable when it was not needed. 
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6. Assuming that Garcia had a duty to contact her tenants for that purpose, 
plaintiffs failed to establish a causal relationship between Garcia's alleged failure to fulfill that 
duty and the subject fire. 
7. Plaintiffs failed to establish that Garcia, her ex-husband or her son-in-law 
altered the roof deicing cable in any way at or after its initial installation. 
DATED this 1? ?• day of June 2000. 
BY THE COUR' 
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Civil No. 94 090 8182 
Civil No. 95 090 0287 PD 
CivU No. 95 090 1841 PD 
Judge William A. Thorne 
(Consolidated Cases) 
Two of the three consolidated actions (Civil Nos. 94 090 8181 and 95 090 1841PD) 
were tried to the court, The Honorable William A. Thorne presiding, beginning on May 22, 
2000. The court having granted the motions of defendants for nonsuit and having entered its 
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findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rules 41(b) and 52 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that the plaintiffs take nothing from any 
defendant, that the actions be dismissed on the merits, with prejudice, and that each of the 
defendants recover from the plaintiffs their respective costs of action. 
DATED this " J O * day of June, 2000. 
BYTHEjSOURT: 
I CERTIFY THAT Jfejlg *S.A TRUE-CSPY OF 
AN ORIGINS DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE 
THIRD DISTRICT-'COURT, SA1T/&KE 
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